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THEATRICALITY:  A DRAMATIC FORM OF CONTESTING SPECTATORIAL CODES  
Goran Petrović-Lotina (2019) 
 
 
The objective of this article is to envisage the body in relation to the redefined notion of 
theatricality. I conceive of the body to be discursively constructed within a particular geo-political, 
cultural and economic context. The inscription of the body within the set of such relations is what I 
call the moment of representation. When representation is understood as the primary level in 
constructing the body, or any other objectivity, then we can say that it belongs to the order of 
performativity. This is to say that every representation is the expression of a plurality of dissimilar 
currents, both linguistic and extra-linguistic, in a single image, which can be articulated through 
various forms of visual and performing arts and everyday actions. The moment of confrontation 
between the spectator and the performed representation renders what I call theatricality. 
Theatricality is manifested through the tension or drama that challenges sedimented spectatorial 
codes: the ways spectators understand objects and forms of identity that are performed. 
 
To perceive the body within the context of a dramatic structure of theatricality means to challenge 
prevailing theories that eliminate the moment of drama between the spectator and the performance. 
To justify this thesis, I take Erika Fischer-Lichte’s theory of the body as a point of departure. I will 
acknowledge that ‘[t]he physical articulations which are seen, heard, smelled, or sensed by other 
spectators or actors … generate perceptible behaviour patterns and actions’ (2008: 153). However, I 
will criticize the possibility of conceptualizing the perceptible in terms of the ‘sheer presence of the 
body or materiality’ that Fischer-Lichte’s theory proposes by introducing the notion of oscillation. A 
critical view on oscillation is the return of drama in performance studies. Once every performance is 
conceived in relation to drama, we cannot fail to recognize that the body is discursively constructed 
through the performative practice of representing and, consequently, that it provides a dramatic 
 
moment of theatricality in relation to the spectator. The performing body mobilizes the spectator’s 
physical and cognitive abilities, that is, both the mind and the body, to envisage different realities 
and contest dominant politics. 
 
To unfold a view on theatricality in terms of drama, first, I will take a closer look at Fischer- 
Lichte’s theory of perception (2008) that she envisaged in post-representational and pre-expressive 
terms, allowing for the perceptual experience of the sheer presence of the body or the being of an 
object. Drawing upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of perception (1947–8), which inspired 
Fischer-Lichte’s theory, I will stress Merleau-Ponty’s representational approach to the perceptual 
experience, which does away with the possibility of sheer presence. Further on, drawing upon 
semiotic phenomenologists Victor Rosenthal and Yves-Marie Visetti (2010), and Antonio Bondi and 
Franceso la Mantia (2015), I will demonstrate that every perceived form that is represented 
functions as an expression of the system constituted by languages and institutions. This view is in 
line with discourse analysis developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), which asserts 
that every social configuration is a result of linguistic and extralinguistic relations and hegemonic 
practices. Once our perceptual experience is envisaged within a theoretical framework that connects 
perceptual experience with languages, practices and institutions, then we cannot fail to notice that 
every sensorial experience is regulated by a hegemonic politics that controls institutions, social 
practices and collective representations. Consequently, it is only through a dramatic encounter with 
a hegemonic politics, rather than through the principle of oscillation, that performances may 
mobilize affects capable of invigorating democracy. 
 
 
ERIKA FISHER-LICHTE: A POST-REPRESENTATIONAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE  
 
To perceive the body within the context of a dramatic structure of theatricality means to challenge 
 
prevailing theories that eliminate the moment of drama or tension between the spectator and the 
performance. I particularly have in mind performance theory developed by Fischer-Lichte. Her 
view on theatricality, scrutinized in the book The Semiotics of Theatre (1992), has important 
consequences for understanding the body in performance that she developed twenty-five years later 
in the book The Transformative Power of Performance (2008). Her understanding of theatricality in 
semiotic terms, as signs of signs, signs that ‘double up’ a cultural system within which performance 
takes place, surprisingly, in her later work, brought about the understanding of the body in 
performance in terms of sheer presence of materiality, which does not convey the meaning, but 
rather evokes ‘a particular effect on its own terms and not as the result of its semiotic status’ 
(Fischer-Lichte 2008: 18). It is Fischer-Lichte’s belief in the possibility of grasping the sheer 
presence of the body or materiality through perception that places her understanding of theatricality 
as beyond representation and conflict, or, what I call, drama of positions. But, is this possible? Can 
we grasp the sheer presence of the material world, of the being of objects and subjects? Isn’t reality 
mediated by language? And, more importantly, does language produce knowledge about reality, or 
institutions and practices regulated by hegemonic politics? In order to answer these questions, let us 
take a closer look at Fischer-Lichte’s theory. 
 
In The Transformative Power of Performance, Fischer-Lichte explains that in the performative 
event both performers and spectators are involved in the common situation of the here and now. 
When performers and spectators share the reality in such a way, that is, when they are both present 
at an event, as in a ritual, the relationship between subjects and objects, between observers and 
observed, and the relationship between materiality and semioticity, that is between signifier and 
signified, undergoes a drastic transformation.1 Their relationships cease to be dichotomous and 
become oscillatory. In fact, it becomes impossible to make clear distinctions between these 
differential positions, between, for example, the artist-object and spectator-subject. By the same 
logic, it becomes impossible to make a clear distinction between the sheer presentness of the 
 
phenomenal body of the actor and the presentness of the semiotic body of the fictional character.  
 
Fischer-Lichte ascribes to the presence of the phenomenal body a purely performative quality, not 
an expressive one. She writes that the phenomenal body enables the actor to command both space 
and the audience’s attention by mastering certain techniques and practices to which the spectators 
respond. In these processes, in which corporeality dominates, the materiality of a performer’s 
actions do not dissolve into a sign, that is, they do not convey meaning. Rather, the performance 
evokes ‘a particular effect on its own terms and not as the result of its semiotic status’ (2008: 18). 
The effect thus evoked by the ‘inexplicable’ appearance of the actor’s body, such as holding the 
breath, is not hence a consequence of the actor’s interpretation of the text that builds a character; 
rather, it is the effect of the actor’s individual corporeality, the sheer materiality of individual 
bodies, voices, pitch, gesture and the characteristic auras that embody being-in-the-world.  
 
Drawing upon Eugenio Barba’s distinction between the expressive and pre-expressive level of the 
artistic articulation, Fischer-Lichte emphasizes that the presence of the phenomenal body appears 
on the pre-expressive level. She explains pre-expressive as a break with ordinary physicality, such 
as starting movement in a direction opposite to the one aimed at, or introducing rhythmic body 
movements, or slow motion, or concurrence of impulse and reaction. The break with ordinary 
physicality ‘enable[s] the performer to bring forth his body as energetic and thereby animate the 
spectator to experience themselves as energized’ (18). Nevertheless, the specific energy that the 
spectator perceives through the performer’s movement becomes, at a certain moment, symbolic. It 
is only at this point that the spectator creates the meaning generated by the sheer materiality of the 
performer’s body.2 Fischer-Lichte asserts that the switch of the spectator’s focus from the 
materiality of the performer’s phenomenal body to the semiotic body of the character is a result of 
perceptual multi-stability lying at the core of the performative event. She writes: ‘While the acting 
and staging techniques … repeatedly fix … the attention on the performers’ phenomenal bodies, the 
 
dramaturgy allows the audience to focus on the character from time to time’ (88).  
 
Perceptual multi-stability points to the coexistence of two orders of perception. One refers to the 
perception of the phenomenal body, that is, the embodiment of an actor and their presence; another 
refers to the perception of the semiotic body, that is, the embodiment of a character and its 
representation. Whereas the order of presence generates meaning that triggers chains of association, 
the order of representation produces meaning that constitutes the character. And, whereas the former 
generates meanings as sensations and emotions that are articulated physically, the later stimulates 
thoughts, ideas and emotions that are articulated internally. Accordingly, meaning is not a matter of 
translation into words; it is the state of consciousness that triggers impulse for action. In this 
context, previously acquired meanings generate another perceptual process and influence what 
Fischer-Lichte calls ‘the feedback loop’s autopoesis’, which she explains in the following way: ‘The 
physical articulations which are seen, heard, smelled, or sensed by other spectators or actors in turn 
generate perceptible behaviour patterns and actions in those who perceive them so forth’ (153). The 
spectator is thus a participant in the performative event. By this, Fischer-Lichte concludes that the 
phenomenal body ‘constitutes the existential ground for the coming into being of the character’ 
(48); it is the co-condition for the spectator’s perceptual shift and thus a co-instance of 
destabilization. 
 
When the relationship between the phenomenal body and the semiotic body is envisaged in terms of 
correlation between the presentness of positions that possess the power to transform the spectator’s 
perception – by generating meaning and stimulating action – then embodiment demonstrates ‘the 
possibility for the body to function as the object, subject, material, and source of symbolic 
construction’ (89). In this view, which has a tendency to overcome the dualism, concepts such as 
text and representation stand merely for ‘the presentness of pretense’ in real time and space. 
 
 
In concluding this section about Fischer-Lichte’s theory, which defines the aesthetic perception as a 
form of oscillation between the two orders of perception, phenomenal and semiotic, it is important 
to stress that in contrast to Hans-Thies Lehmann’s theory, one of the leading advocates of presence 
above representation in theatre and performance studies in continental Europe, Fischer-Lichte 
argues that presence is not associated only with the consciousness of the spectator, but also with 
consciousness articulated through the body. When the definition of presence is accountable for both 
consciousness and the body, then it stands for the condition for overcoming body–mind dualism. 
Presence, Fischer-Lichte suggests, marks the occurrence of something extraordinary that develops 
into an event: it is ‘the nature of man as embodied mind’ (99). In other words, ‘mind articulates 
itself through physicality’ (99). When the ordinary is experienced as extraordinary it is then 
transformed and transfigured. 
 
 
A REPRESENTATIONAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE 
 
Fischer-Lichte’s theory of oscillation is largely inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s work. Fischer-Lichte 
developed a theory of performance as an attempt to overcome the dualism between body and mind. 
She stresses the radical break with essentialism inherent in any form of dualism, by ascribing a 
post-representational approach to the perceptual experience, and by referring to the process of 
meaning-formation in terms of perceptual comprehension. This is how, in a manner of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology, Fischer-Lichte gives perception priority over the Cogito. Besides, her 
intention was to widen the terrain of phenomenology by applying an interdisciplinary method that 
bridges natural and cultural studies, that is, individual cognition and socio-cultural phenomena, or – 
to put it simply – perception and language. As a result, phenomenology ceases to relate perception 
exclusively as experiential activity stimulated by the sheer presence of objects, and, at once, begins 
to address semiotics and linguistics. And yet, by revisiting both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
 
and contemporary semiotic phenomenology, I will show that Fischer-Lichte’s theory of perception 
is incompatible with either position, revealing theoretical shortcomings of her approach. 
 
a) In Phenomenology of Perception, first published in French in 1945, Merleau-Ponty developed a 
view of the body that cannot be seen or touched as far as it sees or touches. He writes that the body 
‘is not one more among external objects’ ([1945] 2003: 105). However, in The Incarnate Subject, 
published only a few years later, in 1947–8, Merleau-Ponty transformed this view. Thinking with 
and against the seventeenth-century French priest and cartesian philosopher Nicolas Malebranche, 
who saw the mind and the body as separate entities, Merleau-Ponty wrote: ‘in order to have light, I 
must have a representative being facing me, otherwise my soul would be dispersed and at the mercy 
of its various states’ ([1947‑8] 2001: 50). What Merleau-Ponty’s assertion implies is that the unity 
cannot be sought in the subject, but rather in the other that represents the being. He designates the 
other or the representative being, which is situated outside the subject, by intelligible extension. 
Once it is touched by intelligible extension, the soul, or the mind, becomes ‘the fact of 
apperceiving’. According to this view, which disorients a subject-centred account, ‘consciousness 
can only maintain relations of apperception with that which is not itself’ (43).  
 
What Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy suggests is that the knowledge of the body is conditioned by 
perceptible phenomena, that is, by intelligible extension. In other words, the knowledge of the body 
(res cogito) is always constructed in relation to the intelligible other (res extensa). What the 
relational aspect of the body implies is that ‘one’s body consist[s] precisely in the fact that it is at 
the same time both mine and other’ (44). Thus envisaged, the phenomenal body presupposes the 
schism or unity between a touching body and a body being touched, overcoming the Cartesian 
dualism between body and mind. The body starts to function both as the subject and the object; in 
other words, the body is always already represented and relationally constructed. As philosopher 
Martin C. Dilon noticed, such an approach to the body demonstrates Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to 
 
‘overthrow dualistic modes of thought in which the spheres of immanence and transcendence are 
seen as radically disjunct’ (1974: 144). 
 
b) Linguists and phenomenologists Antonio Bondi and Francesco la Mantia suggest that ‘it is the 
semiotic practices that generate and organise [perceptual] experience’ (Bondi and la Mantia 2015: 
13). Their assertion implies the three following assumptions: 
 
1) in any subjective experience, perception is immediately semiotic; 
2) the semiotic mediation of experience and perception is inseparable from the forms and values of 
which they are the object; 
3) these forms and values can be conceived only within the social transactions that lead to 
existence. (Bondi and la Mantia 2015: 13) 
 
These assumptions demonstrate that perceptual structures are both expressive and semiogenetic. 
Every perceived form always functions as an expression of some practical layout. In fact, every 
perceived form functions as an expression of the system constituted by languages and institutions. 
Hence, in the view of semiotic phenomenologists Victor Rosenthal and Yves-Marie Visetti, the 
expression of a sentient, of the one who perceives, is conceived ‘not as a completed act, but first 
and foremost in the expectation of the response of the other’ (Rosenthal and Visetti 2010: 55). This 
implies that human experience is valued in its individuality: it is a subjective and private 
experience. Yet, at the same time, it is a matter of a relation to some sort of exteriority, to historical, 
socio-cultural and political structures, that is, a matter of an encounter with the other. According to 
Bondi and la Mantia, any encounter with the other ‘can be seen as a socio-semiotic game that 
involves institutions (knowledge, transmission, norms, values and practices) and distributions of 
roles where the individual understands himself first as a semiotic perception’ (2015: 15). It is 
probably this that Rosenthal and Visetti had in mind when they wrote, five years earlier, that ‘the 
 
subject is not a founding entity, but one that is required, led, by the requirements of the institution’ 
(2010: 55). We can see how, by this method, semiotic phenomenology attempts to avoid the 
deadlock of the exclusivity of the immanence of the individual expression as well as the 
transcendence of the sole symbolic order.  
 
Fischer-Lichte’s intention to apply the complexity of this method, which aims at connecting 
phenomenology with semiotics, onto the body is obvious. The introduction of a bond between the 
phenomenal body and the semiotic body, between being and the subject, is a continuation of 
Merleau-Ponty’s endeavour to overcome dualism. Fischer-Lichte achieves this goal by means of 
oscillation, the operation that does away with difference between the sheer presentness of the 
phenomenal body of the actor, and the presentness of the semiotic body of the fictional character. 
Therefore, unlike Merleau-Ponty’s theory and semiotic phenomenology, in Fischer-Lichte’s view 
the perceptual experience begins on the level of the sheer presence or presentness, rather than on the 
level of representation. Within this context, theatricality is a performative practice that elicits 
oscillation between being and the representation of that being, the latter amounting to, according to 
Fischer-Lichte, ‘the presentness of pretense’ in real time and space (2008: 97). Fischer-Lichte’s 
belief in the possibilities of grasping the being of the body, that is the being in-itself, its presence, 
explains why she fails to recognize that languages, symbols, phenomena and signs are properties of 
institutions that govern various constructions of reality and that the primary level in constructing the 
body is representation. 
 
 
POLITICS OF PERCEPTION  
 
Fischer-Lichte’s intention to link phenomenology and semiotics certainly provides an interesting 
starting point in an endeavour to resolve the mind–body dualism in performance philosophy in an 
 
innovative way. She suggests that the body in an encounter with the semiotic other does not express, 
but rather performs, the possibilities of the body. However, problems with Fischer-Lichte’s 
theoretical approach start here. She asserts that the phenomenal body appears at a pre-expressive 
level, as performative body energized by the performers’ individualistic acts that do not convey the 
meaning, but evoke ‘a particular effect on its own terms and not as the result of its semiotic status’ 
(Fischer-Lichte 2008: 18). This is to say, a performance consists of individualistic acts that 
demonstrate internal reality, something that is simply true in-itself. However, the history of 
phenomenology shows us that an initial illusion of immediacy to the being always gets replaced by 
a semiotic phenomenon. This implies that the most essential possibility of the phenomenon is its 
semiotic construction, and that the sheer presence, presence in-itself, as philosopher Martin 
Heidegger wrote back in 1962, ‘can by no means be ontologically clarified’ ([1962] 2008: 106). 
 
Abandoning a belief that phenomenology may enable an access to the sheer materiality of the body, 
we find ourselves in contact with recent theories of semiotic phenomenology that reconnect 
individualistic acts of constitution with expressivity. This operation is a way of acknowledging, 
following Bondi and la Mantia’s understanding of expressivity, that performance appears as an 
expression of the system constituted by language and institutions.3 However, we cannot envisage 
the relationship between individualistic acts and expressivity as a socio-semiotic game that involves 
institutions (knowledge, transmission, norms, values and practices and so on) without taking into 
account the regulative power of institutions. If we overlook the significance of institutions in 
regulating identities and everyday practices, it becomes difficult to imagine how institutions can 
thereby be contested and transformed. It is for that matter that the transformative power of 
performance should not be sought only in the possibility of transforming individualistic acts 
enclosed within the field of immanence, as Fischer-Lichte’s theory implies, but in the possibility of 
transforming institutions that regulate politics and social conventions within which particular 
human acts are hegemonized. It is only when institutional constraints are transformed that 
 
alternative acts may be both conceived and performed. This task requires the process of contesting a 
hegemonic politics that have power over institutions from a counter-position.  
 
Laclau writes that ‘without constructing a popular identity out of a plurality of democratic demands’ 
‘[t]here is no hegemony’ (2005: 95). According to this view, the process of contesting a hegemonic 
politics requires the construction of a counter-hegemonic popular identity. This practice implies 
articulation of plurality of dissimilar and unsatisfied demands in an equivalential chain of popular 
demands. The popular identity is then the result of collective identifications that presuppose 
agreement in opinions, in shared forms of life: the way we use language, define terms and judge. 
Accordingly, identifications stand for the articulating principles of what Antonio Gramsci calls 
‘popular wills’. Only when the unity is organized around an agreement on the way we use terms, 
the quantity of various wills becomes the quality of popular will.4 This implies that the struggle 
against a hegemonic politics cannot take the form of non-relational individualistic acts, but rather of 
acts that are connected in a collective. The collective consisting of different subordinated 
associations of people, which aim to win the consent of other groups and achieve a kind of 
ascendancy over them, stands for a concrete unity in a counter-hegemonic struggle that 
encompasses a different economic and political project, distinct from the one advocated by the 
hegemonic politics. Accordingly, it is on the collective to contest hegemonic institutions and 
rearticulate them in an alternative way.  
 
The collective strategy of contesting hegemonic politics casts another light on our understanding of 
perceptual experience. First, it stresses that perceptual experience is not a matter of self-contained 
individual acts, but that it is relationally constructed. Merleau-Ponty’s later work is very explicit 
about this. Writing about the sense of touch in his posthumously published essay ‘The Intertwining’ 
(1968) he notes:  
 
 
either my right hand really passes over to the rank of the touched, but then its hold on the world is 
interrupted; or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do not really touch it – my right hand 
touching. (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 148) 
 
From this, it becomes evident that ‘passing over to the rank of the touched’ implies the other, a 
represented being that conditions the self. Once it is acknowledged that the acting subject (the one 
who is touching) and the subject acted upon (the one who is touched) are relationally constructed, it 
has to be recognized that the subject may never be grasped in-itself. It is precisely this that Fischer-
Lichte’s approach overlooks: that perceptual experience does not stand for the abundance of 
individual, selforganized and autonomous acts that are only affectively expressed. On the contrary, 
perceptual experience stands for the shared experience, which is discursively constructed through 
the principle of identification with the other. 
 
Information scientists Daniel Martínez-Ávila and Richard P. Smiraglia wrote that our perceptual 
experience is ‘constructed and transformed day-by-day by political discourse and strategies of 
control that affect the living experience of the people exposed to them’ (2013: 223). What one sees, 
hears, smells and touches is always already inscribed in the set of relations that bears the traits of 
hegemonic politics and conventions, producing effects necessary to maintain certain measures and 
rules. This means that our perceptual experience is collective experience controlled by power 
operated within that which philosopher Michel Foucault called institutional apparatus or dispositif: 
‘a heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions’ (1980: 194). Consequently, it is through the collective strategy of 
contesting hegemonic politics that our perceptual experience can be transformed. 
 
When political logic is understood in relational and collective terms, it becomes apparent that our 
 
perceptual experiences are conditioned by shared contexts, conventions, measures and rules, which 
are regulated by institutions, practices and representational norms. Such a view on perceptual 
experiences requires a detour from the semiotic approach to phenomenology concerned with the 
production of meaning, with the ‘poetics’ of  language, to the discursive approach to 
phenomenology concerned with the effects and consequences of meaning that are regulated by 
dominant politics through languages, practices and institutions. According to this view, perceptual 
experience is discursively constructed by a politics that govern particular affects necessary for the 
reproduction of a hegemonic political order. From the point of view of performance studies, this is 
to say that in the current conjuncture, on the one hand, performance can mobilize affects among the 
audience leading towards the reproduction of demands for the capital, by complying with moral and 
economic laws of neoliberalism, and, on the other, that affects, mobilized by performance, may 
provide a terrain for a counter-hegemonic struggle, by contesting the capitalist techniques of 
production and domination, thus paving the way for alternative politics.5 Consequently, when the 
body is discursively constructed by hegemonic politics that govern particular affects, then a 
counter-hegemonic struggle against domination implies a possibility of investing different affects 
in performing bodies so that they elicit alternative forms of identification among the members of the 
audience. 
 
If the practice of investing affects into bodies means to represent them on a symbolic level, as 
Laclau suggests (2005: 115–16), then every social unity stands for a collective constructed on the 
symbolic level. Recognizing, as Butler suggests, that ‘actors are always already on the stage, within 
the terms of the performance’ (1988: 526), we have to acknowledge that the perceptual experience 
of performance is based on acts that are always already symbolically constructed, that is, invested 
with affects. According to the view that envisages performances as properties of politics constructed 
through the practice of symbolization, neither perceptual experience stands for the sheer presence, 




A DRAMATIC FORM OF CONTESTING SPECTATORIAL CODES 
 
If theatricality is a performative practice of signs of signs, as Fischer-Lichte correctly observes, then 
our perceptual experience of performance cannot be envisaged in relation to the sheer presence of 
the body. A belief that individualistic acts of performing bodies may enable access to the sheer 
materiality of the body appears as the weakest point of this approach. It overlooks that the most 
essential possibility of the phenomenon is its discursive formation, thus missing the point that 
performing bodies are always already regulated by language, practices and institutions, and that our 
perceptual experience is governed by them. By foreclosing the recognition that every performance, 
just like every social practice, is regulated by institutions appropriated by hegemonic politics, 
Fischer-Lichte’s post-representational approach to phenomenology renders performance theory 
unable to grasp the nature of ‘the political’ in inherently conflictual and agonistic terms.6 This is 
why the relationship between the performance and the audience may be conceived in terms of 
oscillation, as Fischer-Lichte’s theory implies, only when that which is performed complies with 
hegemonic politics. 
 
In order to contest hegemonic politics, we need to envisage the relationship between performance 
and the audience in an alternative way. Once we have acknowledged that our perceptual experience 
is a collective experience governed by hegemonic politics, through languages, practices and 
institutions, then we have to conceive the relationship between the audience and the performance in 
political terms as the encounter of conflict, tension or drama of positions. In this view, drama is not 
simply a matter of style, of an encounter between the differential symbolic positions tied to 
language (thought, speech, document and so forth) and motivational calculus or actions, as in 
Kenneth Burke’s theory of dramatism.7 Rather, drama is an encounter guided by the logic of 
 
political formation. Far from manifesting through the operation of oscillation, a dramatic encounter 
enables the practice of contesting sedimented spectatorial codes: the ways spectators understand 
forms of representation that are performed and modes of identification that they impose. Such a 
dramatic moment of confrontation between the spectator and a performed representation is what I 
associate with theatricality. Theatricality implies that the body, discursively constructed through the 
performative practice of representing, enables a dramatic moment between the spectator and the 
performance to take place. In fact, the performing body mobilizes particular affects for the 
audience, thus employing the spectator’s physical and cognitive abilities to envisage different 
realities, engage with hegemonic politics and contest them.  
 
Finally, I would like to stress that the return of drama introduces a movement beyond the dualist 
thought that is gaining ground in performance studies. Unlike oscillation that deletes differences 
suggesting the possibility of a harmonious society, the moment of drama points out that human 
societies, just like social practices, including performance, may only be conceived as the effect of 
paradoxical and conflictual relations between differential discourses about society. This assertion 
implies that every representation, or every formal structure that is discursively constructed, 
including performance and theatricality, is at once the organizing principle of the mind and the 
ultimate reality of an object. Accordingly, the performing body may be perceived only at the level 











1. Performative event in Fischer-Lichte’s theory corresponds to the anthropological view on ritual 
as a performative event a la Richard Schechner. See Schechner (2003: 52-88). 
2. In Fischer-Lichte’s theory, the meaning is associative, not an interpretation; it emerges without 
intention; and it is linguistically inexplicable and unmotivated. Meanings appear as memories or 
new meanings; they are not based on inter-subjectivity. See Fischer-Lichte (2008: 143). 
3. The meaning of expressivity in Bondi and La Mantia implies the other, a sort of exteriority, such 
as language, practices and institutions. As such, it differs from the meaning of expressivity proposed 
by performance scholar Bojana Cvejić, who connects it to Spinoza's notion of adequation, which 
implies the thing in-itself, without relational aspect. See Cvejić (2015). 
4. On the notion of ‘collective wills’ see Gramsci (2007: 164). 
5. I have distinguished complying from contesting artistic forces in Petrović Lotina (2017).  
6. I understand agonism in Chantal Mouffe’s terms as ‘adversarial agonism’. See Mouffe (2005a, 
2005b). 
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